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which there has been more discussion than has been true of the data covering 1771 to 1781.

ARCHER B. HULBERT.

A Naval History of the American Revolution. By GARDNER W. ALLEN. In two volumes. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1913. Pp. xii, 365; viii, 366-752.)

THESE careful volumes throw light on many obscure incidents and phases of the maritime struggle for American independence and the origins of the United States navy. Finding that exhaustive research has been confined to the few brilliant episodes of the war, Dr. Allen has undertaken to discuss the bearing of the maritime efforts of the colonists upon the military, diplomatic, and commercial problems of the period. His method is that of blending extracts from contemporary documents into a more or less coherent narrative or argument. He deals with these selections rather as an editor than a critic. His exact reproduction of citations may give an occasional effect of quaintness, but it sometimes throws a suspicion of illiteracy upon men who wrote after the seafaring fashion of the age. Logs have always been written curtly and bluntly enough, and their amplification for controversial or apologetic purposes does not make for a fluent, graphic, or accurate style. Most of the Revolutionary captains had to account for failure; but the letters of the most successful among them are equally entangled in controversy. John Paul Jones counted every notable commander as a rival; and his references to Manley, with whom he had never served, are hardly less bitter than his denunciations of his recreant consort Landais.

The author, though not a professed biographer, does not criticize the bristling self-assertion of Jones, but he does condemn Manley for losing the *Hancock*, in spite of the verdict of a court martial which placed the blame elsewhere. John Adams followed Washington in declaring Manley the peer of any American officer of the fleet, and he opposed the tendency to exalt "foreigners of the South" at the expense of New England seamen. Dr. Allen holds that Manley "failed to stand the test" when pursued by a British squadron, but this belated censure is not altogether convincing.

The most obvious criticism of this substantial work relates to its failure to fulfil the expectations raised by its title and preface. The naval protagonists in the wars of the American Revolution sailed under the flags of England and France. Even Spain and Holland made a greater effort to secure the strategic command of the sea than their American ally. Dr. Allen hardly mentions cruises and battles unless they took place in American waters, and the actual employment of the British navy is not fully shown. Even the names of its successive commanders are left uncertain. Rear-Admiral Stephen Graves, whose inactivity enabled the seamen of Massachusetts to take so many rich prizes, does not appear in the index, and the reader is left to confuse

him with his kinsman the first Lord Graves. Something is said of the quarrel between Arbuthnot and Rodney, but a brief reference to Sir J. K. Laughton's lives of all these commanders, as published in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, would have been more informing. The bearing of the naval campaigns of the war can hardly be shown without a full discussion of their strategic results; but neither these nor the simpler problems of naval tactics have been analyzed or explained.

The bibliography contained in the appendix is extensive and valuable, though its arrangement is such that a key should have been offered in the general index. Naturally the list of sources is incomplete. Fortescue's *History of the British Army* contains suggestive pages; Trevelyan's *History of the American Revolution* is more worthy of mention than the work of Belcher; and the *Memoirs* of John Jay, which give an account of a cruise in an American frigate whose officers were too impecunious to order a bowl of punch for their French allies, also contain some general views of naval policy. The works of John Adams are cited, but more use might have been made of them, since their author, though by no means free from passion and prejudice, was, in his degree, a founder of the American navy and a loyal champion of its development.

Such general views as Dr. Allen has found time to elaborate are judiciously stated. He condemns privateering as failing to compensate by the capture of prizes for its destructive effect upon naval discipline; "ships of reprisal, where no discipline is", were condemned by the Elizabethan admirals who had sailed in them; and Seward must have been the last statesman holding a responsible position who hoped to employ foreign rovers to prey on British commerce. Our author holds that naval protection will be needed "until international arbitration has taken the place of war"; but even Jefferson was aware of a more lasting need for the police of the sea. Thus Madison in the *Federalist* (no. 41) urges the need of a fleet to protect our commerce and our harbors from "the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians" and to hold in check the "unruly passions" which would be let loose on the ocean to insult and pillage Americans during the next European war—a prediction which he must have remembered when he fled from the capital a generation later. The liberation of Spanish America was not accomplished without the development of predatory interests outside the pale of international arbitration. Hamilton held in another chapter (no. 11) that we should have enough ships of the line to decide a West Indian campaign in favor of either belligerent; this would enable us to "bargain for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality." Failing this he was ready by 1798 to lead an American army on a filibustering expedition in South America in absolute dependence upon the command of the sea by the British fleet and its co-operation in this war of adventure. International morality and American patriotism have naturally advanced beyond the standards advocated by Hamilton.

C. G. CALKINS.